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NOTES AND LEGISLATION.
Res Judicata and Two Coordinate Federal Agencies *
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
the case of United States v. Five Cases * * * Capon Springs Water,'
recently contributed a helpful opinion on a problem with respect to which
there has been considerable confusion. This problem arises out of the
exercise of the dual jurisdiction over claims made on behalf of food, drugs,
devices and cosmetics which is exercised by the Food and Drug Administration of the Federal Security Agency 2 under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act,8 and which is vested in the Federal
Trade Commission
4
by the amended Federal Trade Commission Act.
Both laws are equipped with sanctions designed to eliminate false and
misleading representations with respect to food, drugs, devices and cosmetics within the area of federal control. The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act controls the labeling of these classes of commodities. The
jurisdiction of the amended Federal Trade Commission Act extends to all
acts which constitute unfair methods of competition in commerce or unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. Advertising, as well as labeling, of food, drugs, devices and cosmetics, therefore, falls within the scope
of the revised Federal Trade Commission Act. Before the passage of both
laws in 1938, the issue of which law should control advertising of food,
drugs, devices and cosmetics was considered extensively and debated spiritedly by the law makers.5
Involved in the Capon Springs Water case was the seizure section of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 6 which provides for the seizure
and condemnation, after judicial trial, of misbranded food, drugs, devices
and cosmetics. The Federal Trade Commission Act provides for the issuance of a complaint against the distributor of the offending product, a hearing, and the issuance of a cease and desist order.7
* The views expressed in this note are those of the writers, and are not intended
to represent the official position of the Department of Justice or the Federal Security
Agency.
I. 'I56 F. (2d) 493 (1946).
2. The Food and Drug Administration and its functions were transferred from the
Department of Agriculture in 1940. Sec. 12 of Reorganization Plan No. IV, 54 STAT.
1234, 1237.
3. 21 U. S. C. 301 et seq.

4. 15 U. S. C. 41 et seq.

5. See Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative His-

tory and Its Substantive Provisions (1939)

6 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 2,

12-19; Kleinfeld, Legislative History of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(1946)

I FOOD, DRUG & CosMInc LAW QUARTERLY 532, 551-552, 557-562, 564-568.

6. 21 U. S. C. 334.
7. 15 U. S. C. 45. That the institution by the Federal Trade Commission of proceedings with respect to a food, drug, device or cosmetic does not divest a district court
of its power and duty to hear and adjudicate a condemnation action under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act has been determined in several cases. The clearest
holding to this effect is found in United States v. i Dozen Bottles * * * Boncquet
Tablets, 146 F. (2d) 361 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944). See also United States v. Research
Laboratories, Inc., 126 F. (2d) 42, 45 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. 5'. 656
(1942) ; Sekov Corporation v. United States, 139 F. (2d) 197, 198 (C. C. A. 5th,
1943).
(388)
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In 1936, the Commission proceeded against the distributors of Capon
Springs Water.8 The Commission charged in its complaint that the respondents, in their pamphlets, booklets, and leaflets, represented and implied that the water would cure fifty-two named diseases "ranging from
nephritis to chronic pneumonia [whatever that is] and from poison ivy to
sterility." 9 It was further charged that this conduct constituted unfair
competition in commerce. After joinder of issue extended hearings were
held, following which the Commission filed its findings, conclusion and
cease and desist order. The basic finding was that the use of the water
alone would not cure the various diseases for which the respondents had
represented that their product was a cure. The cease and desist order restrained the respondents from representing that the water alone would cure
any of these diseases. Notwithstanding the limited scope of the order, the
respondents sought judicial review in the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the order.'0 Subsequently,
the respondents submitted a report of compliance to the Commission
pursuant to the latter's requirements.
Several years thereafter, the United States filed a libel of information in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, against five
cases of Capon Springs Water which had been shipped in interstate commerce. The Government charged that the article was misbranded in that
its label bore false and misleading statements within the meaning of Section 502 (a) of the Act." It is clear that the label statements involved in
that proceeding and the representations in a leaflet complained against by
the Commission tended to convey the same impressions. This is readily
seen from a comparison of the statements made in each.' 2 The respondents
in the earlier Federal Trade Commission proceeding intervened as claimants,
8. Actually, this proceeding was commenced and terminated under the Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U. S. C. 41 et seq. (1934 ed.). However, so far as
the subject of this paper is concerned, there is no essential difference between a proceeding under the predecessor statute and one under the amended Federal Trade Commission Act of 1938.
9. Capon Water Co. et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, io7 F. (2d) 516, 518
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1939).
io.Ibid.
H. 21 U. S. C. 352
12.

(a).

Label involved in libel action:
"Rebuilds as it Cleanses * * *
"The Indians Called It Ca-Ca-Pa-On-'Health Water' * * *
"Known to physicians as alkaline, because it contains by nature those elements needed to counteract acidity.
"**
beneficial in restoring the normal activity of the kidneys and
bowels.
"Use According To A Natural Law of Health * * *
"For the best results * * * drink 2 glasses on rising, 2 more during the
morning, 2 during the afternoon and i or 2 at night * * *"
Leaflet involved in Commission proceeding:
"REmESIHES"
('CLEANSES"

5. It has prompt action on the kidneys.
blood of acid and toxic poisons.'

Capon cleanses your
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in the condemnation action and specially pleaded res judicata 13 on the
basis of the decision rendered by the Federal Trade Commission.
The District Court sustained this defense, and a judgment of dismissal
was entered. The rationale of the opinion of the District Court was that
full litigation had been had before the Federal Trade Commission with respect to the therapeutic value of the product, and "the Commission simply
placed its condemnation upon the claim that this water alone would cure." 14
The Court concluded:
"It gave its approval, by a failure to condemn all the other claims
which included 'those mentioned in Exhibit i * * *" 15
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected
as "unwarranted" the District Court's interpretation of the Commission's
order.' 6 The Court of Appeals could not reconcile "how a failure to
make any finding except that the use of 'Capon Springs Water' alone
would not have curative effects can be the equivalent of a finding that the
water had the curative effects when not used alone." The Court elaborated
this thesis in emphatic language, and reversed the judgment of the District Court.
Although the Court of Appeals did not so state, its opinion may be in
conflict with the holding of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
1
for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Willard Tablet Co. 7 In that
case, which also involved seizure proceedings under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act based on the alleged misbranding of a drug, the
claimant's plea of res judicata was likewise founded on a prior Federal
Trade Commission disposition. In the lower court 18 this plea was sus"REBuiLDs"

6. It regulates the bowels. Capon restores their normal peristaltic action (the eliminative urge).
7. It acts as a natural tonic. Capon supplies every one of the
sixteen elements in your body."
"WHY
*

*

THE INDIANS CALLED IT CA-CA-PA-ON-'HALING WATES'
1

'Capon water is known to physicians as alkaline * * *"
13. A separate plea of res judicata, based on a judgment of dismissal in a seizure
action brought under the Food and Drugs Act of i9o6, 21 U. S. C. I et seq. (1934 ed.),
was also filed. See United States v. Ninety-Four Dozen * * * Bottles Capon
Springs Water, 48 F. (2d) 378 (E. D. Pa. 1930), aff'd, 51 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1931). The District Court, in the instant case, "fortified" its decision to dismiss the
action on the basis of this plea. 62 F. Supp. 736, 739 (1945). The Circuit Court of
Appeals was not impressed with the plea because of the patent diversity of issues. i56
F. (2d) 493, 495 (1946). Dismissal of the earlier seizure action turned on the absence
of fraudulent intent, which is not an element in enforcement proceedings brought under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
14. United States v. Five Cases of Capon Springs Water, 62 F. Supp. 736, 739
(S. D. N. Y. 1945).
15. Ibid. Exhibit i was the leaflet before the Commission, extracts from which are
quoted in footnote 12 supra. The label admitted in evidence in the Commission's proceeding was the same as the label involved in the seizure action. It was placed in eviden ce before the Commission, however, merely for identification. The District Court
found that ". . . that the label with the statements thereon was not specifically passed
on" by the Commission.
I6. United States v. Five 'Cases, etc., 156 F. (2d) 493, 495 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
17. 141 F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).

I8. Decision without opinion by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana.
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tained. On appeal, the Cricuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
was persuaded by the facts, as stipulated, that the Government's contention
that there had been no prior adjudication of the issue sought to be litigated was untenable. The court declared:
"The stipulation discloses: (i) that the statements relied upon by
the government to uphold the charge of misbranding are identical with
those approved 9 by the Federal Trade Commission; (2) that the
fundamental issue of fact as to whether the Willard Tablets would
give the relief
claimed was considered by the Federal Trade Com20
mission."

Interestingly enough, the court in the Willard Tablet case based its
decision on the proposition that the issue sought to be litigated had been
"considered by the Federal Trade Commission," rather than that this issue
had been settled by a direct, uneguivocal, adverse finding by the Commission. It appears that with respect to the issue of truth or falsity of represensations concerning the therapeutic value of the product, which was
denied litigation in the seizure action, the Commission hdd found that "such
preparation when used with such treatment may provide relief from the
symptoms of distress caused by an excess acid condition and by stomach
and duodenal ulcers which are due to or persist because of excess add." 21
Under the rationale of the opinion in the Capon Springs Water case, such
an equivocal approval by the Commission may well be considered not to
constitute a "finding of fact" of the character
referred to by the Circuit
22
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in the Willard
Tablet Co. case, was obviously influenced by the "incongruous situation
of one branch of the' government approving the method now pursued by
the claimant and another branch seeking to condemn. This is, to say the
least, placing claimant in an embarrassing situation and should be avoided
if possible." 23 The reluctance of the Court to permit further litigation of
a matter which had once been "considered" by a tribunal of the Government is understandable. Putting aside the rigid rules of res judicata, 24 the
application of two separate laws with one general purpose, administered by
two distinct agencies of the Government, can create an "incongruous
situation" burdensome on industry. This, however, is more properly a
matter of Congressional rather than judicial dilemma.
ig. The stipulation did not use the word "approved". It referred to a report of
compliance transmitted by the respondent to the Commission, and to a reply by the
Commission that the sample advertising which comprised the report showed compliance
with the cease and desist order.
20. See footnote 17 mpra, at 142.
21. Paragraph 7 of Modified Findings of Fact; Fed. Tr. Com. Docket No. 3100.
22. It is to be noted, however, that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
did state that "In . . . United States v. Willard Tablet Co. . ...
it was held that
an estoppel by judgment existed against the United States . . . in respect to findings
of fact rendered in a prior proceeding which were in favor of the defendant." 156 F.
(2d) 493, 495 (1946).
23. See footnote 17 supra, at 143.

24. The appellate court in the Capon Water case used the term "res judicata" in
the sense of direct estoppel when it said, "Clearly the decision in the prior proceeding
was not res judicata since it was founded upon a different claim from that asserted in
the case at bar." See RESTATMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) pp. 157-160. For an authoritative discussion of the two aspects of res judicata, i. e., direct and collateral estoppel
by judgment, see Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment (1942) 56 HARV. L. REV. i,
2-7. The question of collateral estoppel was involved in the Capon, Water case.
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The question whether the rule of res judicata properly should be
invoked to prevent separate and full litigation under both the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act
has not yet been presented for determination by the Supreme Court. It
has, however, arisen in inferior federal courts in a number of instances
25
26
in addition to the Capon Springs Water and Willard Tablet cases.

Most

recently, the claimant in the seizure action of United States v. 14 Cartons,
etc., "Ayds Candy. * * *," 27 brought under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, successfully pleaded res judicata on the basis of a prior
Federal Trade Commission proceeding. It was based on the decree of
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit setting aside the
28
Commission's cease and desist order.
While the Circuit Court of Appeals based its decision largely on the
proposition that the Commission had failed to adduce substantial evidence
to sustain the allegations in its complaint, it brushed aside as "mere puffing
or dealer's talk" certain statements attacked by the Commission which the
libel in the seizure action also alleged were false and misleading. Query:
Does this mean that the rule of caveat emptor will be permitted by the
operation of the technical principles of res judicata to dislodge the concept of caveat venditor which is the basic philosophy of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act ? 29
In view of the avowed objective of both laws to protect the consuming public, it would appear to be in the public interest for the courts to
refuse to permit the application of one of the laws to bar the application of
the other law except, at best, where compelled to by the most rigid aspects
of the rule of res judicata. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in its decision in the Capon Springs Water case, appears to have
adopted this philosophy. This approach of not applying the doctrine of
res judicata inflexibly where there are opposing considerations of public
policy has been followed by the courts in other fields, including the field
of tax litigation. For example, in Pelham Hall Co. v. Hassett, ° the question involved was the extent to which a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, which had become final, had the effect of res judicata in litigation
involving a subsequent tax year. The Court stated:
25. None of these is reported.
26. In George H. Lee Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 113 F. (2d) 583 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1940), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that an estoppel
by judgment existed against the Commission, operating under the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, in respect to findings and a decree rendered by a district court in
a prior condemnation suit instituted under the Food and Drugs Act of 19o6.
27. This ruling was made June IO, 1946, by the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Case -No. 3736.
28. Carlay Company et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, 153 F. (2d) 493 (1946).
29. See United States v. Ninety-five Barrels . . . Vinegar, 265 U. S. 438, 442443 (1924). The philosophy underlying the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
was expressed eloquently by Senator Royal S. Copeland, the sponsor of the Act, at the
hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1944,
73rd Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 277-78, one of the earlier of the series of bills which culminated in the passage of the law:
"I am glad that the witnesses have borne in mind that the purpose of this bill
is not primarily to control industry. The purpose of the bill is to protect the public, to protect the mothers and the children, to protect the citizens; and the fact
that regulation is needed is not because the reputable concerns are unwilling to
conform to high standards; it is because there are those in the country who are
exploiting the public and desirous of imposing their products upon the public for
gain. So that is why we have a bill before us at all; it is that the public may be
better protected against the unscrupulous than it is at present."
30. 147 F. (2d) 63 (C. C. A. 1st, 1945).
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"It would be possible to play with words by asserting that the issue
presented to the Board was whether the Commissioner was in error
in reducing the taxpayer's basis for depreciation * * *; that the
Board's decision upheld the Commissioner's determination; and that
the taxpayer cannot escape the binding effect of this decision in litigation involving the same issue for a succeeding tax year by producing a new argument or new evidence in support of the proposition
previously decided against it. * * * The matter should be put this
way only if the policy behind the doctrine of collateral estoppel by
judgment is deemed to be so strong that the courts should be astute to
give the doctrine the widest possible application. * * *
"We rest our decision in the case at br upon the ground that
the question whether the transaction was a tax-free reorganization
* * * was not 'actually litigated and determined' * *
"
(Italics
supplied.)
A more direct approach to the problem has not yet been made by the
courts. As a matter of public policy, should the considerations underlying
the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act prevent the application of the rule of res
judicata and permit full litigation under both statutes?
Fundamentally, the rule of res judicata is based on the public policy
that at some time litigation must cease. However, although the doctrine
is a principle of.universal jurisprudence, there are situations where the
courts have refused to apply it because of opposing public policy considerations. It has been stated that "The term 'res adjudicata' is not a fetish
before which all defenses must bow down." " Thus, in United States
v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. et al.,33 the Supreme Court
held that, without legislative action to the contrary, the doctrine of immunity should prevail where there was "a collision between the desirable
principle that rights may be adequately vindicated through a single trial of
an issue and the sovereign right of immunity from suit."
The recent case of Mercoid Corporationv. Mid-Continent Investment
Co. et al.,34 is much in point. It involved a suit for contributory infringement of a patent. The Supreme Court (four Justices dissenting), held
that the rule of res judicata did not foreclose the defense, which might
have been asserted in a former suit, that the plaintiff should be barred from
relief because it was seeking to extend the grant of the patent to unpatented dexices. The Supreme Court emphasized that, by applying the doctrine of res judicata, it "would be placing its imprimatur on a scheme
which involves a misuse of the patent privilege and a violation of the
anti-trust laws. It would aid in the consummation of a conspiracy to expand a patent beyond its legitimate scope." " The Court stated that the
determination whether it would be in accordance with policy to aid plain31. Id. at 67-68. See also Stoddard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 141 F.
(2d) 76, So (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).

32. See E. E. Souther Iron Company v. Woodruff Realty Company, 175 Mo. App.

246, 258, 158 S. W. 69, 72 (1913) ; In re DiCarlo's Estate, 3 Calif. (2d) 225, 235, 44
P. (2d) 562, 567 (1935) ; Kalb et ux. v. Feuerstein et ux., 308 U. S. 433 (1940) ; Sola
Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173 (I942) ; B. W. Smith v. E. L.

Henderson et al.,

23

La. Ann. 649 (1871).

33. 309 U. S. 506, 514-515 (940).
34. 320 U. S. 66I, 669-67o (1944).

35. Id. at 67o.
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tiff's.scheme is not "dependent on the usual rules governing the settlement
of private litigation. 6
And in United States v. Stone & Downer Co. et al.,87 the Supreme
Court, in holding that judgments of the Court of Customs Appeals did
not have res judicata effect, stated in part that "There of course should be
an end of litigation as well in customs matters as in other tax cases; but
circumstances justify limiting the finality of the conclusion in customs controversies to the identical importation. * * * The evidence which may be
presented in one case may be much varied in the next. The importance
of a classification and its far-reaching effect may not have been fully understood of clearly known when the first litigation was carried through.38 And
although the rule varies in different jurisdictions, a number of courts have
declared that the rule of res judicata "as applied in tax litigation, is sufficiently elastic to permit of the balancing of conveniences and the weighing
of other considerations as against that of desired repose." 39
,Clearly, there are strong policy reasons for rejecting the rule of res
judicata so as to permit the full exercise of both the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. The statutes
are remedial in nature, designed to protect the public health and pocketbook. Thus, the beneficent design of the statutes has caused the courts
to declare with unanimity that a liberal construction must be given to their
terms.40 The strong reasons of public policy for not so applying the doctrine of res judicata as to defeat the public interest are consistent with the
patent purposes of food and drug regulation. 4' The Supreme Court has
declared that regard for such purposes "should infuse c6nstruction of the
legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of government and
not merely as a collection. of English words." 42
Some very interesting questions inherent in the major problem of the
effect of the doctrine of res judicata on the operation of the two laws have
not yet been answered adequately. For example, does a decision by the
Federal Trade Commission which may be modified or vacated because of
36. Id. at 67o.
37. 274 U. S. 225,'235-236 (1927).

38. For an interesting discussion of this case and its effect on the application of

the doctrine of res judicata to customs and internal revenue matters, see Dwan, Administrative Rezdew of Judicial Decisions: Treasury Practice (1946) 46 COL. L. REv. 581,

585-589.

39. Henricksen v. Seward et at., 135 F. (2d) 986, 989 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943). See
Monteith Bros. Co. v. United States, 142 F. (2d) 139, 140-141 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944) ;
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Security-First National Bank, 148 F. (2d) 937
(C. C. A. 9th, 1945). Compare Blair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3o0 U. S.
5' (937) ; Tait v. Western Md. R. Co., 289 U. S. 62o (1933). For a collection and
discussion of authorities involving this problem in the tax field, see Griswold, Res
Judicatain Federal Tax Cases (1937) 46 YALE L. 3. 1320.
40. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115, 128 (1913) ; United States v. Antikamnia Chemical Co., 231 U. S. 654, 665 (1914); Charles of the Ritz Distributors
Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F. (2d) 676, 679 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) ; Irwin
v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F. (2d) 326, 325 (C. C. A. 8th, 1944).
41. Presumably these considerations would be pertinent to the question of successive litigation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. However, the applicability of judicial estoppel to successive seizure actions (under The Insecticide Act,
7 U. S. C. 121 et seq.) involving the same claimant, product, and labeling was decided
adversely to the Government in George H. Lee Co. v. United States, 42 F. (2d) 46o
(C. C. A. 9th, 293o). For a brief discussion of this precise problem, see Lee, The
Enforcement Provisions of the Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1939) 6 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 70,

83-84.

42. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277, 28o (1943).
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have the characteristic of
change of law or fact, or in the public interest,
43
finality which is implicit in the doctrine?
In this connection, the basis of the court's conclusion in the Willard
Tablet case " that the Commission's order was final within the rule of res
judicata is of questionable validity. The court relied on the conclusiveness
45
It is
of the Commission's order in a proceeding to enforce the order.
shall
Commission
the
of
an
order
that
obvious that when Congress provided
be
become final, it was the Congressional design that the order shall
46
But
immune from attack in a proceeding brought to enforce the order.
this does not deprive the Commission of the authority given it by the Act
to reconsider and modify its orders. In the Willard Tablet case reliance
was also placed on the conclusiveness of the Commission's findings of fact
in a petition to a circuit court of appeals for direct review of an order of
the Commission.4 7 Clearly, however, it is the finality of a judgment which
is an essential element in the rule of res judicata, and the limitations upon
an appellate court in reviewing findings of fact in a direct appeal are totally
unrelated to this concept.
There are other unanswered questions. Must the defense of res
judicata fail because of a lack of mutuality of estoppel? 48 In view of the
differences in language in the two laws, are the issues sought to be litigated
in a condemnation action instituted under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act ever the same as those determined in a Federal Trade Commission proceeding? 49 Since an order of the Federal Trade Commission
presumably is not res judicata with respect to future action by the Commission, 50 should it estop another arm of the Government operating under
a separate Congressional enactment,?
43. 15 U. S. C. 45 (b) ; American Chain & Cable Co., Inc., et al. v. Federal Trade
Commission, i42 F. (2d) 909, 91I-912 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944); American Drug Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission, 149 F. (2d) 6o8, 6o9 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945). It is
well-settled that a judgment which does not adjudicate the ultimate rights of the parties or finally put the case out of court is not a final judgment within the meaning of
the rule of res judicata. 2 BLAcK, JUDGMENTS § 695 (2d ed. i9o2) ; G. & C. Merriam
Co. v. Saalfield,-241 U. S. 22, 28 (1916); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) §§41 (e),
68 (s).
44- 141 F. (2d) 141, 143 (0944).

45. 15 U. S. C. 45 (g) and (I).
46. See United States v. Piuma, 4o F. Supp. iig (S. D. Cal. 194), aff'd, 126 F.
(2d) 6oi (C. C. A. 9th, 194).
47. See i5 U. S. C. 45 (c).
48. See Keokuk and Western Railroad Company v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 307, 317
(894); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U. S. I1, 127
(1912) ; 34 C. J. 988, sec. 1407. Query as to the importance of the factor that the
degree of the burden of proof in the two types of proceedings differs. See 15 U. S. C.
45 (c) ; C. C. Company v. United States, 147 F. (2d) 82o (C. C. A. 5th, i944) ; Van
Camp Sea Food Co. v. United States, 82 F. (2d) 365 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1936). Furthermore, notwithstanding the entry of a cease and desist order by the Federal Trade Commission, could the respondent in a subsequent libel for condemnation action instituted
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act be deprived of his right to a jury
trial? See 27 U. S. C. 334 (b).
49. See I5 U. S. C. 45 (a), 55 (a); 21 U. S. C. 343 (a), 352 (a), 362 (a).
5o. See note 43 supra. See also Wallace Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 323 U. S. 248, 253 (i944); National Labor Relations Board v. Baltimore Transit Co., et al., 14o F. (2d) 51, 54-55 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944), cert. denied, 321
U. S. 795 (I944) ; National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Young et al., 134 F. (2d) 524,
526 (App. D. C. 1943) ; Brougham et al. v. Blanton Manufacturing Co., 249 U. S. 495
(i979). But see MoscHizSKER, STATE DECIsis, RES JUDICATA AND OTHER SELECrED
ESSAYS (1929) 77-78.
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Regardless of how or whether these various questions will ultimately
be determined, the state of facts present in the Capon Springs Water case
approximates the situation usually presented when a decision under one of
the two laws is interposed as res judicata in litigation instituted under the
other. The decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals will undoubtedly have a persuasive effect on courts of other circuits when similar situations arise.
Vincent A. Kleinfeld.t
James B. Goding.$
The Priority Provision of the Pennsylvania Chattel Mortgage Act
The passage of the Chattel Mortgage Act in I945 ' has given status
to the chattel mortgage equal to the bailment lease and the conditional sale
as a security device in Pennsylvania personal property transactions. Although the chattel mortgage had been recognized to a limited extent in
earlier statutes, 2 this is the first instance of a general chattel mortgage
statute in Pennsylvania. Prior to the Conditional Sales Act,3 the bailment
lease was the principal device for effecting the sale of a chattel with retention of a security interest by the seller.4 While there is a formal difference in the terms of the agreement, the bailment lease and the conditional sale are in substance identical transactions in which goods are sold
by seller to buyer, seller retaining an interest in the goods for the period
during which buyer is making instalment payments on the full purchase
price. The end result of both is that buyer has paid the full price of the
goods sold, plus the carrying charges, 5 whether the intermediate payments
are designated as rental or as part payment.6 The result is the same when
a chattel mortgage is taken to secure payment of the purchase price of the
goods sold.7 Since Section i of the Act limits the use of the chattel mortgage to security for a bond or a note, it is unlikely that it will displace the
t Head, Trade and Consumer Unit, Administrative Regulations Section, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice.
t:Attorney, Food and Drug Division, General Counsel's Office, Federal Security
Agency.
I. Note (1946) 50 Dicz. L. REv. 72.
2. (Mining rights) Act of April 5, 1853, P. L. 295, 21 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) § 831; (Leaseholds) Act of April 27, 1855, P. L. 368, 21 PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-

don, i93o) § 838; (Iron ore and products, petroleum, slate and cement) Act of April

28, 1887, P. L. 73, 21 PA- STAT. ANN. (Purdon, x93o) § 861 ; (Coal rentals and royalties) Act of May 13, 1889, P. L. 197, 21 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930); §891;
(Vessels) Act of March 7, 1929, P. L. 14, 21 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) § 921;

(General chattel, mortgage statute covering only loans by federal governmental agencies) Act of July 15, 1936, P. L. 47, 21 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1945) § 841.
3. As amended, Act of July 12, 1935, P. L. 658, 69 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp.

1945) Chapter 2.
4. Leitch v. Sanford, i79 Pa. I6o, 165, 123 Atl. 658, 66o (1924) ; Note (I94)
U. OF PA. L. Rv. 77, 82.

90

5. "If the owner of the goods is willing to surrender title for the sum of the rental
payments, the transaction is a sale, and nothing more remains to be said." Montgomery, The Pennsylvania Bailment Lease (93)
79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 920, 930.
6. Link Machinery Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 227 Pa. 37, 75 Atl. 985 (910);
Kelly Springfield Road Roller Co. v. Spyher, 215 Pa. 332, 64 Atl. 546 (19o6).
7. In I PATON's DIGEST (1940 ed.) § I, the author distinguishes the chattel mort-

gage from the conditional sale on the ground that the former is principally a security
transaction, the latter principally a sale. Professor Bogert argues that these two transactions should be treated alike in the law, since they have identical objects and effects.
2A UNIF. LAws ANN. (1924 ed.) § IO.
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conditional sale or the bailment lease in the consumer installment sale
transaction." However, in third party lender situations, neither the conditional sale nor the bailment lease is available for direct use; 9 thus, in this
situation and in simple loans on notes the chattel mortgage is the appropriate device.10 The factual similarity of these three transactions has not
resulted in similar treatment by the courts or by the legislatures; this is due
partly to historical accident,'- partly to the pre-occupation of judges and
advocates with niceties of legal concepts at the expense of economic realties.
It is purposed here to discuss in particularity the Chattel Mortgage
Act as it affects the relation of the interests of the chattel mortgagee to the
interests of the prior real property mortgagee of realty to which the mortgaged chattel has been attached.1 2 Section 5 of the Act purports by its terms
to give priority to the chattel mortgagee in this situation; to determine
whether it is adequate for its purpose is the object of this discussion.
The Language of the Provision

The direct legislative ancestor of the 1945 act is the 1943 act 13 which,
however, covered only agricultural chattel mortgages, and the prior provisions of which, so far as is material here, related only to crop mortgages.
The draftsmen of the present act have done only an "insert job" and the
difficulty of providing in one sentence for priority of lien in such diverse
situations as the crop mortgage and the chattel mortgage on industrial ma8. See Mulder, The Pennsylvania Chattel Mortgage Act (1946) 17 PA. BAR AssN.

244, who suggests that the requirement of a bond or a note is attributable
to the fact that the Act was designed primarily to secure loans rather than sales. Id.
at 245. And see Report of Committee on Legislation of the Pennsylvania Bankers
Association (1945) 66 MONEY AND COMMRCE 66. See also Berger, War and PostWar Pennsylvania Contracts, Decisions and Statutes (1946) 95 U. OF PA. L. REv.
30, 45. But in may conditional sales transactions a note or series of notes is given for
the purchase price when the seller desires to discount.
9. See Glenn, The Conditional Sale at Common Law and as a Statutory Security
(1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 559, 573. Where a debtor in order to secure a loan sells his
chattel to a creditor, receiving it back as a sale conditioned on his paying the loan, the
transaction is held to be a chattel mortgage. Cappelletti v. Tierney, ioi Conn. 562,
See
126 Ad. 839 (1934); Lyon v. Nourse, 104 Wash. 3o9, 176 Pac. 359 (19,8).
Webster Hall Corp. of America v. Continental Bank and Trust Co., 66 F. (2d) 558
(C. C. A. 3d, 1933), where it was held that a conditional sale may secure not only
payment of the purchase price of goods, but also the purchaser's general issue of bonds.
This decision has been criticized in (1934) 47 HeRv. L. Rxv. 534. Of course, if the
third party lender takes an assignment from the seller of the conditional sales contract
or the bailment lease the transaction is valid, but the lender may find himself subjected
to defenses of breach of warranty, etc. These risks he may not wish to assume, and even
QUART. 242,

the use of a negotiable note does not always confer holder-in-due-course status upon
one who takes an assignment of the conditional sales contract. But see, e. g., International Harvester Co. v. Carruth, 24 S. (2d) 473 (La. App. 1945) ; General Contract
Purchase Corp. v. Moon Carrier Corp., 129 N. J. L. 431, 29 A. (2d) 843 (1943).
IO. The financing of dealers is normally accomplished by the use of the trust re.eipt. See McKeehan, The Uniform Trust Receipts Act (1941) 46 DicK. L. REV. 1O9.
Tn Pennsylvania the trust receipt generally has been held to be not subject to the Conditional Sales Act. Id. at 112. Contra: General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 5o8, i42 S. E. 767 (1028).
ii. Professor Bogert suggests that since the chattel mortgage is the oldest of the
devices, the courts are prone to conclude that it was intended where the facts are
dubious. 2A UNIF. LAws ANN. § io, at page ii.
12. On specific aspects of the fixtures problem, see Notes (1941) 90 U. OF PA. L.
87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 995.
REV. 77, (939)
13. Act of May 21, 1943, P. L. 343. A reading of the 1945 act section by section
against the 1943 act indicates that the draftsmen of the 1945 act by appropriate inserts
attempted to change the statutes, from an agricultural act, to a general chattel mortgage
act. The only new section is section 16. All prior acts subject by subject and practically line for line, except for inserts, are identical.
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chinery is responsible for some uncertainty of interpretation in the latter

situation.
The history of the language of Section 5 is enlightening. To ensure
federal funds for Pennsylvania farmers it was necessary to comply with the
federal requirement that the lien of a chattel mortgage on crops should be
a first and paramount lien.1s ' This the 1943 and prior acts did in clear
and simple language.1 4 As introduced into the legislature the proposed
1945 act, by the simple device of inserting the words ** * * chattels including * * * in front of the word * * * crops * * * apparently gave the same
priority to the lien of a chattel mortgage on chattels attached or to be
4
attached to the realty as the 1943 act did in the case of crop mortgages.1 1
Literally interpreted this language would have provided that a subsequent
chattel mortgage would take precedence over the lien of a lrior industrial
mortgage on chattels already attached to the realty. While there are
strong arguments for protecting the lender whose money has procured a
new chattel's no sound argument could be advanced for divesting the lien
of the industrial mortgage once it had attached to a chattel. On April 9,
1945, therefore, the sponsor of the bill offered as an amendment the language now appearing as the "provided further" part of section 5,but made
This might indicate that the lien
no alteration in the prior language. 15
of a subsequent chattel mortgage is to be superior to a lien of a prior mortgage on the realty except where the lien of a prior industrial mortgage has
already attached to the chattel. For example, where the chattel was affixed
to realty or incorporated into the plant prior to the creation of the chati3a. See, e. g., 12 U. S. C. A. See. 1172 (1) (c) 44 STAT. 1059 (1927), giving
national agricultural credit corporations power to make advances upon notes, etc.,
which are secured at the time of discount ".
. by chattel mortgages, and other like
instruments conferring a first and paramount lien upon livestock . . . or on agricultural crops being grown for market" (Italics supplied.)
14. The second sentence of section 5 of the act of 1943 read: "The lien of any
chattel mortgage on crops executed pursuant to this act shall be superior to any tnortgages, deeds of trust or judgments or other liens upon the land upon which any such
crop has been or is to be seeded, or may be growing, and any sale made under any
mortgage, deed of trust or judgment on such land or otherwise, before said crops have
been severed, shall be made subject to the lien on the crops as provided for in this act."
(Italics supplied.) Act of May 21, 1943, P. L. 343, 344.
I4a. Senate Bill No. 548, Session of 1945, introduced by Mr. Gourley, March 19,
1945, in the second sentence of section 5 reads as follows: "The lien of any chattel
mortgage on any chattel or chattels attached to reality [sic] including crops executed
pursuant to this act shall be superior to any mortgages, deeds of trust or judgments
or other liens upon the realty or land upon which any such crop has been or is to be
seeded or may be growing and any sale made under any mortgage, deed of trust or
judment on such realty or land or otherwise before said chattels or crops have been
severed shall be made subject to the lien on the chattels and crops as provided for in
this act. (Italics supplied.) The matter in italics constitutes the insertions made by
the draftsmen of the 1945 act in the text of the 1943 act. Obviously the peculiar nature of growing crops and the necessities of agricultural finance warrant such treatment. See, e. g., United States v. Kemmerer, 43 D. & C. 197, 19 Leh. L. J. 301 (Pa.
1941), giving a crop mortgage priority over a prior real property mortgage under the
Act of July 15, 1936, P. L. 47, which is still in force. Cf. Karns v. East Central Fruit
Growers Prod. Credit Ass'n, 2o D. & C. 83 (1934) ; Hughes v. Summit Realty Co.,
12o Fla. 136, 162 So. 343 (1935) (perennial citrus fruits) ; In re Buchanan, 24 F. (2d)
553 (1928).
15. See Note, Defeating the Priorityof an After-acquired Property Clause (1935)
48 HARv. L. R-v.474, and compare the generally favored position of a purchase money
mortgagee of realty.
15a. 29 Legislative Journal, p. 2159, I36th Session of General Assembly, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. "Provided further, That any real estate mortgage covering the realty and chattels attached to realty shall remain a prior lien -to a chattel
mortgage placed subsequently thereon. . . " Act of June I, 1945, P. L. 1358, -§5,
21 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1945) § 940.5.
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tel mortgage the latter would be a subordinate lien. But a purchase money
chattel mortgage duly recorded would, under this interpretation have first
priority. The use of the term "mortgage . . . on realty or land . . ."
in the main part of the sentence, and the contrasting term "real estate
mortgage covering the realty and chattels attached to realty . . ." in the
proviso lends support to the suggestion that the proviso relates only to the
industrial mortgage and to chattels already attached. Certainly any interpretation that would cast doubt upon the validity of crop mortgages to a
United States farm credit agency should be strenuously avoided as should
an interpretation of the proviso that would nullify entirely the effect of the
words inserted in the main sentence by the 1945 act. The need for clarification with regard to chattels other than crops is evident. But whether
the interpretations suggested above will be given effect must be considered in the light of the common law tradition of the industrial mortgage
in Pennsylvania, which construes such a mortgage to include all parts of the
operating plant whether physically attached or unattached or whether
mentioned in the descriptive clause or not.' 6
The Scope of the PriorReal Property Mortgage
The effect of the provision in Section 5 which gives priority to chattel
mortgages on chattels to be attached to realty upon which there is a mortgage will depend in the first instance upon the courts' interpretation of the
scope of the prior real estate mortgage. Decisions stemming from the case of
Voorhis v. Freeman'7 have given content to the Pennsylvania doctrine of
industrial mortgages beyond that of any jurisdiction which recognizes a
,variation of the rule that chattels adapted to the use of the realty become
a part of it.18 Its emphasis upon protection of the security interest of the
real property mortgage has resulted in the defeasance of the chattel security holder's interest under a conditional sale where the two interests conflict.' 9 The substance of the doctrine is that a mortgage intended to
cover the industrial plant of a business embraces all the machinery, whether
physically attached or unattached, 20 indispensable to that business as a going concern, 21 although the machinery is not specifically mentioned in the
16. Whether physically attached or unattached: '!Whether fast or loose, therefore,
all the machinery of a manfactory which is necessary to constitute it, and without
which it would not be a manufactory at all, must pass for a part of the free-hold."
Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116, 11g (Pa. 1841); Titus v. Poland Coal Co., 275
Pa. 431, 119 Atl. 540 (1923).
Whether mentioned in the descriptive clause or not:
Roos v. Fairy Silk Mills, 334 Pa. 305, 5 A. (2d) 569 (939) ; Commonwealth Trust
Co. v. Harkins, 312 Pa. 402, 167 Atl. :278 (1933).
17. 2 W. & S. 116 (Pa., 1841). It was held that a mortgage of the lot and rollingmill constructed thereon covered the entire set of rolls used in the mill, and these could
not be levied on under a f/. fa. and sold as chattels.
iS. Cf. Lumpkin v. Holland Furnace Co., 11S N. J. Eq. 313, 178 At. 788 (935).
19. Where the interest of a bailor under a bailment lease is involved, the courts
hold almost invariably in favor of the bailor as against the real property mortgagee.
Case v. L'Oeble, 84 Fed. 582 (E. D. Pa. 1897); American Laundry Machine Co. v.
Miners Trust Co., 307 Pa. 395, 161 Atl. 306 (1932) ; Holland Furnace Co. v. Mitchell,
78 P. L. J. 317 (Allegheny C. P. 1929). Whether this is a result of judicial deference
to conceptual formalities of title or of the peculiarly favored position of the bailment
lease in Pennsylvania can only be speculated. See Montgomery, loc. cit. supra, note 5.
It is not without significance that the chattel security interest prevails in the only
judicially recognized form of chattel security, and that in the types subsequently validated by statute, the courts have favored the interests of the prior real estate mortgagee until specific legislation to the contrary was enacted.
20. See'note I5 mnpra.
21. Morris's Appeal 88 Pa. 368 (1879).
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descriptive clause of the mortgage; 22 so that the security interest in a chattel subsequently attached to realty which is subject to a mortgage is subordinated to the all-embracing rights of the real property mortgagee. This
interpretation has been extended by later decisions beyond its original
application to manufacturing establishments alone; and the rule now includes office-buildings, 2 apartment houses,2 4 and residences. 25 Whether
there is an after-acquired property clause which specifically mentions the
chattels subsequently attached is apparently immaterial; 26 nor is it necessary that they be substituted for fixtures originally used
on the premises
2
at the time the real property mortgage was executed. 7
The economic considerations that impelled the development of this
doctrine are manifest and especially persuasive in so highly industrialized
a state as Pennsylvania. To encourage the financing of large industrial
enterprise safeguards were erected to insure to the lender a maximum of

protection for his security, even at the expense of another smaller lender
whose only security is the chattel he has sold. Historically, the primary
security of the lender on a real property mortgage was the land. But the
courts recognize that in an industrial mortgage transaction it is the enter-

prise as an operating plant which induces the lender to advance money to
the industrialist; and if he is thrown upon the land to recover his investment, he is not receiving the security for which he bargained.2"
Thus, the
rights of intervening chattel security holders in machinery attached to a

manufacturing plant subject to a real estate mortgage were subordinated to
those of the prior real estate mortgagee 21 in furtherance of this judicially
sanctioned economic policy. That these economic considerations are of
transcendent importance is indicated by the special treatment given in the
Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act to mortgages in excess of $20,000 made

by a corporation or business trust on a building or manufacturing plant,
intended to cover plant and equipment.

It is there provided that such

22. See note 16 supra.
23. Medical Tower Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co.,
1939).

1O4

F. (2d) '33 (C. C. A. 3d,
_1

24. Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Stout, 339 Pa. 3o2, 14 A. (2d) 282 (1940).
25. Holland Furnace Co. v. Suzik, 118 Pa. Super. 405, i8o Atl. 38 (1935).
26. (Not mentioned in after-acquired property clause) Commonwealth Trust Co.
v. Harkins, 312 Pa. 402, 167 Atl. 278 (1933) ; (Mentioned in after-acquired property
clause) Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Stout, 339 Pa. 302, 14 A. (2d) :82 (1940).
27. Bullock Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lehigh Valley Traction Co., 231 Pa. 129, 8o Atl.
568 (1911).
:28.

"Due to the demands and requirements of our changing economic order, we

early developed in this State the principle of an industrial mortgage which included,
as part of the freehold, personal property in and about a manufactory. This principle
became more important as our industrial life expanded, so that the necessary credits
to sustain and finance manufactories and other like industries could be obtained with
some degree of certainty that the security offered would be continued. . . . This
opened the way for persons interested in such industries to assure investors in a manufactory not only of a stable security for money loaned on the plant, but one that could
not be broken down by selling it piecemeal." Roos v. Fairy Silk Mills, 334 Pa. 3o5,
308, 5 A. (2d) 569, 571 (1939). See McClure v. Atlantic Rock Co., 339 Pa. 296, 301,
14 A. (2d) 124, 126 (294o).
29. Medical Tower Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 104 F. (2d) 133 (C. C. A. 3d,
1939) ; Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Harkins, 312 Pa. 402, 167 AUt. 278 (1933). But
cf. Ridgway Dynamo & Engine Co. v. Werder, 287 Pa. 358, 135 AUt.. 216 (1926).
However, where the terms of the mortgage do not expressly include machinery later
to be acquired, it seems a legitimate inference that the subsequently acquired machinery was not contemplated as security by the parties or that the mortgage was
drafted in the light of the Pennsylvania industrial mortgage doctrine and that such.
chattels would fall within the scope of the mortgage by operation of law. The former
inference is precluded by the definition of the rule, the latter is a rationalization for
shoddy draftsmanship.
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mortgages shall be valid as to after-acquired property added to the plant
up to thirty years from the date of the mortgage.30 This special provision
stands out as peculiarly significant, for one of the primary objectives of
this act is to give to the chattel mortgagee rights equivalent to those of a
conditional seller under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act against owners
and prior encumbrancers of realty to which chattels are subsequently attached. 3
Against this background, when the court is confronted with a situation where a chattel subject to a properly executed chattel mortgage is
attached to realty on which a prior industrial mortgage has been granted,
it will be forced to re-examine the industrial mortgage doctrine in the light
of the new statute.
If the lien of the prior industrial mortgage is preferred, then the effect
of the Chattel Mortgage Act as applied to financing of new industrial fixtures will be severely restricted. Against the decisions at common law
and under the Conditional Sales Act 32 can be arrayed the policy favoring
the bailment lessor and the policy of the amendment of 1935 to the Conditional Sales Act. 2' But it may be doubted whether the courts would
make such a breach from common law precedent in the absence of an
unequivocal statutory mandate, 33 especially in the absence of any protection for the legitimate interests of the industrial mortgagee when a
severance is made.
The Requirement of Severability Without Material Injury to the Realty
Section 5 sets forth no qualification that the chattel need be severable
without material injury to the realty.3 4 If this section is to be interpreted
literally, it must mean that any chattel, however integrated into the physical structure or operating plant to which it is attached, may be taken and
sold by the chattel mortgagee on default of the mortgagor. 5 Such a literal
interpretation, however, could not be sustained upon any authority.30 In
balancing the equities of the prior real property mortgagee against the
30. UNIFORM CHATTEL MORTGAGE AcT §24 (I)
(d) (iii), (1926) Handbook, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 427. This Act has not
yet been adopted anywhere.
31. (1925) Handbook, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State

Laws 732.
32. See notes 17, 23, 24, 25, supra.

32a. On the use of statutes as declaratory of public policy and as analogy for common law decision, see Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, HARVAvD LEAL EssAys
(934) 213 et seq.
33. ". -

.

a change from the common law cannot be presumed; it must appear to

have been meant, or it will be held not to have been made." Jessup & Moore Paper
Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 283 Pa. 434, 442, 129 Atl. 559, 562 (1925).
34. Of course, crops always are severable without physical injury to the freehold.
The 1943 Act therefore was silent on the point. As a practical matter in most industrial situations a rule of priority is all that is needed, for if the chattel mortgagee
has priority, the real property mortgagee will, to preserve his security, buy off the
chattel mortgagee.
35. Act of June I, 1945, P. L. 1358, § 14, 21 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp.
1945) § 940.14. This section provides for repossession and sale by the chattel mortgagee.

36. In none of the cases is the chattel security-holder given the overriding power
of repossession, regardless of the manner in which the chattel is affixed to the realty.
Wheat v. Otis Elevator, 23 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927); Viking Equipment Co.
v. Central Hotel Co., 230 Mo. App. 304, 91 S. W. (2d) 94 (1936).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

402

[Vol. 95

chattel security interest holder, the courts have attempted to protect the
interest of the former while permitting the latter to reclaim his property
or enforce his lien.

Generally, whether the chattel mortgagee, bailor under

a bailment lease, or conditional seller, will be permitted to reclaim his
goods will depend upon whether they can be removed without material
injury to the realty 3 or without impairment of the real property mort38
The content of these generalizations varies with the
gagee's security.

court's emphasis upon physical annexation 3 9 and the functional indispensability of the chattel to the uses of the realty 40 as determinative factors.
The Pennsylvania cases defining material injury to the realty as injury to the entire operating plant were decided under the Conditional Sales
Act,41 but their roots are embedded in the same authority that gave rise
to the industrial mortgage doctrine.42 An analysis of the decisions handed
down prior to the enactment of the Act indicates that the later cases
strain toward a consistency that is more illusory than substantial in the

older cases.

Thus, although the rule is accepted without question, there

is a distinct qualitative difference between its earlier and its current definition. Where bailment leases are concerned, the manner of affixing the

chattel to the realty is considered of paramount importance, and the de43
cisions are pitched upon the permanent nature of the attachment.

Sev-

erability without material injury to the realty as physical structure rather
than operating plant is controlling in determining whether the attachment
is permanent. 44 The same criterion is used in the conditional sales cases

decided prior to the enactment of the present Act. 45 Thus, in Wickes Bros.
v. Island Park Association 4 judgment was given for the conditional seller
against the prior real property mortgagee on the ground that there was
no indication of an intention to annex the chattel primarily because the

machinery was easily removable without injury to the building where it
was installed.
It is significant to note that under the earliest Conditional Sales Act
in Pennsylvania, 4 7 in the case of Ridgway Dynamo & Engine Co. v.
Werder 48 a conditional seller was permitted to replevy a motor generator
set installed in a mine from the purchaser on foreclosure of a prior real
estate mortgage. The Court reached this result by a line of reasoning fol37. In Re Voight-Pros't Brewing Co., 115 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o).
38. Dauch v. Ginsburg, 214 Cal. 54o, 6 P. (2d) 952 (193).
39. Hachmeister v. Power Mfg. Co., I65 Ark. 469, 264 S. W. 976 (1924).
40. Lumpkin v. Holland Furnace Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 313, 178 At. 788 (935).
41. Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co., 316 Pa. 300, 175 Atl. 697
(1934) ; Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Security Peoples Trust Co., 133 Pa. Super.
18, I A. (2d) 520 (1938). An amendment to section 7 of the Act was required to
bring Pennsylvania into line with the uniform interpretation of the provision. Myhre
v. Michigan Silo Co., 220 Wis. 593, 265 N. W. 703 (1936). The section now provides,
"Goods . . . shall not become a part . . . of any operating plant of which they
form a part, but shall be treated as severable. . . ." Act of July 12, 1935, P. L. 658,
§ 1, 69 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1945) § 404.
42. See note 17 supra.
43. American Laundry Machinery Co. v. Miners Trust Co., 307 Pa. 395, 161 At.
306 (1932) ; Case v. L'Oeble, 84 Fed. 582 (E. D. Pa. 1897). But cf. Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433, 167 At. 321 (933).
44. American Laundry Machinery Co. v. Miners Trust Co., 307 Pa. 395, 161 At.
3o6 (1932).

45. Bullock Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lehigh Valley Traction Co., 231 Pa. 129, So Atl.
568 (1911).

46.
47.
of May
48.

229 Pa. 400, 78 Atl. 934 (1911).
Act of June 7, 1915, P. L. 866. This statute was repealed six years later. Act
1, 1923, P. L. 117.
287 Pa. 358, I35 Atl. 216 (1926).
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lowed in the majority of jurisdictions 49 that the real property mortgage
was not taken in reliance on the representation of the mortgagor's ownership of the machinery since it was not brought on the premises until after
the mortgage was executed. The court stated that the motor generator
set would have become part of the realty since it was necessary to the
operation of the mine; 50 but the statute there involved provided expressly
that chattels so attached were to be treated as severable, conditioned upon
the conditional seller's tendering to the real property mortgage a bond to
repair any damages caused by the removal. 51 Later decisions have distinguished this case on the ground that removal of the property would
not have impaired the integrity of the plant.5" But this cannot seriously
be urged as a ground of distinction, for a motor generator set that furnishes power to operate other machinery in the mine is patently as integral a part of the operating plant as an elevator in an apartment house.
In the cases under the Conditional Sales Act, the Pennsylvania courts
have consistently disposed of the equitable argument that the prior real
property mortgagee should not be able to prevent the conditional seller
from re-possessing his chattel because it was not part of the security upon
which the mortgagee relied in taking the mortgage " by considering the
after-acquired property within the scope of the mortgage. 54 But in
most cases to allow the real property mortgagee a lien on machinery
subsequently brought on the premises is to give him security additional to
that for which he bargained. 55 An exception may be recognized
in the case of mortgages to secure construction loans; a mortgagee
who advances funds to finance the construction of a building is relying
upon the potential value of the building to be erected, not the bare site
as it stands when the mortgage is executed.58 But even in these cases a
line can be drawn beyond which the real property mortgagee's lien on afteracquired property may not extend; what the limitation on his security
should be may be determined by calculating the effect on the real property
mortgagee's security margin of5 7including in his total security the value of
a chattel subsequently attached.

49. Holt v. Henley, 232 U. S. 637 (1914); Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq. 244,
14 Atl. 279 (1888). BRoNsoN, FixTuREs (1904) § 29 (a) at 149. In the cases under
the present Conditional Sales Act, this line of authority is expressly repudiated. Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co., 316 Pa. 300, 310, 175 Atl. 697, 7o2
(1934).
5o. Ridgway Dynamo & Engine Co. v. Werder, 287 Pa. 358, 135 Atl. 216 (1926).
51. Act of June 7, 1915, P. L. 866, § 3.
52. Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co. (No. 3), 315 Pa. 312, 315,
175 Atl. 7Ol, 7o3 (1934).
53. The rule rests upon an equitable preservation of the lien of the chattel mortgagee upon the chattels after they are transmitted into realty; there is no reason, suggests the New Jersey court, why an engine worth $Io,ooo when attached to realty
should retain its character as personalty because of a $50o chattel mortgage. Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq. 244, 253 (1888).
54. See notes 23, 24, 25, supra.
55. McClain v. Saranac Machine Co., 94 Col. 145, 28 P. (2d) loo9 (1934);
Hachmeister v. Power Mfg. Co., 165 Ark. 469, 264 S. W. 976 (1924).
56. Dauch v. Ginsburg, 214 Cal. 540, 6 P. (2d) 952 (1931) ; Broadway Improve-

ment & Investment Co. v. Tumansky, 2 Cal. (2d) 465, 41 P. (2d) 553 (935).
In this
sort of cases there is usually evidence that the mortgagee was shown plans and specifications, aid it is invariably inferred that the entire building in its finished condition
was contemplated by the parties as security.
57. In none of the cases does the court attempt to determine the extent of the contemplated security by simple computation, i. e., that the additional value of the disputed chattel could not have been in contemplation of the parties because it enhances
beyond the usual ratio of security to loan the total value of the real property mortgagee's security.
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Conlwusion
The obvious purpose of the priority provision of the Chattel Mortgage Act is to make the chattel mortgage a practical security device by
protecting the security interest of the chattel mortgagee against the prior
real property mortgagee, and thereby to increase the credit potentiality of
the borrowing public.5 The industrial mortgage doctrine is deeply fixed
in the bedrock of Pennsylvania law, and it is certainly basis for reasonable
doubt that Section 5 as it now stands will achieve this purpose. Since an
amendment to the Conditional Sales Act was necessary to remove conditional sales from the ambit of the industrial mortgage doctrine, 55 it may be
doubted that Section 5 will prevent the courts from holding that machinery subsequently attached to an operating plant is within the scope
of the prior real estate mortgage, 0 or from imposing on the chattel mortgagee's right of possession and sale the requirement of severability without
material injury to the realty as operating plant.
It is submitted that to interpret the statute literally would be to violate
the legitimate security interests of the prior real estate mortgagee by
permitting the chattel mortgagee to take possession of the mortgaged goods
on default regardless of damage to the realty. Unless some statutory protection is devised for him, the statute will work as inequitably against the
real property mortgagee as did the Conditional Sales Act before its amendment against the conditional seller. Thus, it is believed that section 5
should be amended, to provide separate treatment for the agricultural problem and the industrial problem, with similar treatment for all types of personal property security in the latter case. A proposed amendment to
achieve this end is suggested in the footnote,"' although it might be more
58. Report of the Committee on Legislation of the Pennsylvania Bankers Association (1945) 66 MONEY AND COMMERcE 66. The committee was especially interested
in releasing additional sources of security for G. I. loans.
59. See note 41 supra.
6o. The priority provision may work in favor of the prior real property mortgagee where credit is needed to replace wornout machinery or to expand the facilities
of the enterprise, assuming that he is unable to finance the addition of new machinery.
To the extent that this is effected by loans from other sources in order to maintain or
increase the productive capacity of the plant, to this extent is the security of the mortgagee protected or, indeed, enhanced.
6i. Such an amendment might read as follows:
Sec. 5. (a) Any chattel mortgage executed pursuant to this act shall be a lien
upon the property described therein as provided in section 2 of this act. Such lien
shall have priority from the time of filing of the chattel mortgage as provided in section 8 of this act in accordance with the following provisions of this section:
(b) The lien of such chattel mortgage shall be good and valid against and superior
to all rights of subsequent purchasers, subsequent mortgagees, subsequent lienors and
incumbrancers, including levying and attaching creditors, and all persons subsequently
dealing with the mortgaged property and subsequently acquiring an interest therein.
And as to all such persons the chattel shall be treated as severable and subject to
removal.
(c) In the case of any motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer with respect to
which a certificate of title is isuable under the Vehicle Code, approved the first day
of May, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine (Pamphlet Laws, nine hundred
five) as amended, the lien of any chattel mortgage thereon shall have priority from
the time a statement of such lien is noted on the certificate of title issued with respect
to such motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer purspant to the provisions of said Vehicle
Code.

(d) In the case of crops the lien of any chattel mortgage thereon executed pur-

suant to this act shall be superior to any mortgages, deeds of trust or judgments or
other liens upon the land upon which any such crop has been or is to be seeded, or
may be growing, and any sale made under any mortgage, deed of trust or judgment
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desirable in the light of other problems to enact entirely separate statutes
for each situation.
Until the courts hand down a definitive interpretation of this provision, or the legislative acts thereon, the practitioner may anticipate a defense by obtaining the consent of the real property mortgagee before advising his client to accept a mortgage on a chattel to be attached to mortgaged
realty.
R. M.L.
on such land or otherwise before said crops have been severed shall be made subject
to the lien on the crops as provided in this act.
(e) In the case of chattels attached to realty other than crops the lien of any
chattel mortgage thereon shall be superior to any mortgages, deeds of trust or judgments or other liens upon the realty, including liens upon an operating plant, and such
chattels shall be treated as severable and subject to removal, if, prior to the
attaching of the chattel to the realty, the chattel mortgage or a copy thereof,
together with a statement signed by the mortgagee or mortgagor briefly describing
the realty and stating that the chattels are to be attached thereto, shall have
been filed in the office of the prothonotary for the county in which said realty is situate:
Provided, however, if an owner or prior encumbrancer of the said realty shall demand
a bond to protect him against loss, resulting from damage which may be caused to
the land or to the physical structure of the buildings or other improvements to which
such chattels are attached by the removal of the said chattels subject to a chattel mortgage, the chattel mortgagee or his successor in interest shall deliver to the said owner
or prior encumbrances a good and sufficient bond, conditioned for the immediate making of such repairs, said bond to be in a sum equal to the cost of making said repairs,
before commencing the detachment or removal of the said chattels. If the amount of
the said bond cannot be agreed upon by the parties, upon petition by any party in interest, the amount shall be fixed by the common pleas court of the county where the
chattel mortgage is filed at the sum necessary to repair the damage to the land or to
the physical structure of the buildings or other improvements to which such chattels
are attached, caused by the removal of the chattels subject to the chattel mortgage.
"Prior" as used in this section refers to the time of attaching the chattels to the realty.

